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Raising the Bar: Establishing an Effective Remedy 
against Ineffective Counsel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Allen Aldrich made two mistakes. First, while intoxicated, he 
drove his pickup truck through a crosswalk and slammed into a 
disabled woman in a wheelchair.1 She died in the hospital shortly 
thereafter.2 Second, Aldrich hired a terrible attorney. 
Not only did Aldrich’s attorney fail to convey a plea bargain 
under the mistaken belief that it was unethical to discuss the plea 
bargain with his client,3 but he also repeatedly recognized the need 
for defense experts yet failed to timely designate a single one.4 What 
is more, Aldrich’s counsel lacked a basic understanding of simple 
discovery procedures.5 For example, despite repeated correction 
from both the prosecutor and the court, he persisted in his assertion 
that he did not have to do any investigation, perform any witness 
interviews, or make any attempt to obtain discovery under the 
misguided belief that that was all the State’s responsibility.6 
But things got much worse once the trial began. Aldrich’s 
counsel did not know how to question witnesses.7 He did not 
understand the rules of evidence.8 And the defense theories that he 
presented were strange and offensive.9 For instance, the bulk of 
 
 1.  Aldrich v. State, 296 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App. 2009). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 243 (“Aldrich argues that trial counsel failed to adequately convey the 
twenty-year plea bargain to him. The record before us contains defense counsel’s letter 
rejecting the plea bargain, and it supports Aldrich’s position. The letter specifically sets forth 
defense counsel’s belief that it would be unethical and would constitute malpractice for him to 
even discuss the proposed plea bargain with Aldrich.”). 
 4.  Id. at 245. 
 5.  Id. at 233. 
 6.  Id. at 245 (“Instead, even after receiving the benefit of multiple continuances, 
defense counsel undertook little or no investigation—until just a few weeks before the July 25, 
2005 trial setting—based on the unreasonable decision that Kyles required the State to 
perform an investigation for him . . . .”). 
 7.  Id. at 251 (“The record reflects that defense counsel had great difficulty 
questioning witnesses.”). 
 8.  Among other problems, Aldrich’s counsel repeatedly asked to have jurors removed 
from the courtroom to make simple objections to leading questions. Id. at 252.  
 9.  Id. at 247. 
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defense counsel’s cross-examination consisted of eliciting testimony 
that the victim’s death was not an accident caused by a drunk driver, 
but was an assisted suicide attempt—that the victim was trying to kill 
herself or that the victim’s husband had intentionally pushed his wife 
into the path of the speeding car.10 
Not surprisingly, on appeal the court found Allen Aldrich’s 
counsel constitutionally ineffective and Aldrich received a new trial.11 
But what is surprising is that nothing happened to Aldrich’s 
counsel.12 There was no disciplinary hearing, no formal reprimand, 
nor any consequence for the defense attorney’s extremely deficient 
and “bizarre” performance.13 In fact, the deficient attorney was never 
 
 10.  Id. at 256. One of the bizarre cross examinations of a police officer went as follows: 
Q. The thing that she was riding in had four wheels? 
A. Yes, sir, I believe it would have. 
Q. She was not afoot. She was riding and it was propelled by an electric motor, was 
it not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And is that—do you know that that’s the definition of a motor vehicle? 
A. A motor vehicle— 
. . . . 
Q. Well, let me ask you this. Did you believe in your initial investigation that the—
Mr. Hudson and Mrs. Hudson had made a left turn and started walking across the 
crosswalk, that they would have seen the oncoming—this oncoming traffic, the one 
that before and during and after my client was—that ultimately hit her, that they 
deliberately made a left-hand turn to walk across the place where they knew that 
these cars were going to come? Did you realize that the night you were out there? 
A. Do I believe they deliberately stepped in front of your client? 
Q. That’s for the jury to decide. I’m just asking you, did it—in your investigation as 
the senior officer out there, people with long debilitating injuries, sometimes they 
commit suicide, don’t they? 
A. In Texas, the people in the crosswalk have the right-of-way. 
Q. Well, that’s the wrong law, but if that’s what you believe, you’re incorrect. 
. . . . 
Q. All right. Now, did you, taking in the scene, the lighting, the ability to see a 
person that was coming as the Hudsons were, to see oncoming traffic, the 
realization that they walked right in front of this oncoming car, did you make sure 
and say, Hey, be sure to question Mr. Hudson about why he did such a thing? Did 
you mention, suggest, gosh, this guy had the opportunity, looks like he just walked 
her out there in front of the cars. Did anything like that happen? 
Id. at 247–48. 
 11.  Id. at 260. 
 12.  Find a Lawyer: Paul W. Leech, ST. B. TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/ 
AM/ Template.cfm? Section= Find_ A_ Lawyer&template=/ Customsource/ MemberDirectory/ 
MemberDirectoryDetail.cfm&ContactID= 224590 (last visited Dec. 25, 2014). 
 13.  See Aldrich, 296 S.W.3d 225; Find a Lawyer: Paul W. Leech, supra note 12. 
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even named in the appellate court opinion.14 The attorney continued 
to practice and continued to give incompetent representation in 
other cases.15 
This scenario is not uncommon.16 Rarely, if ever, are defense 
attorneys reprimanded after being found constitutionally deficient.17 
Rarely, if ever, are defense attorneys named by the court that finds 
the counsel ineffective.18 As a result, the practice of law sets its 
“sights on the embarrassing target of mediocrity.”19 And when 
mediocrity becomes the “prevailing standard of practice,”20 society 
loses faith in the system itself. So what can be done? 
This Comment explores this question. Part II discusses the 
standard of ineffectiveness, as established by Strickland, and how the 
Supreme Court inadvertently created the framework for the current 
 
 14.  See Aldrich, 296 S.W.3d 225. The trial attorney’s name, Paul Leech, was only 
discovered after searching the Denton County Court Records. DENTON COUNTY RECORDS 
INQUIRY, http://justice1.dentoncounty.com/PublicAccessDC/ (follow “District Clerk 
Criminal Case Records” hyperlink under “Case Records”; then search by defendant for last 
name “Aldrich” and first name “Allen”; then follow “F-2004-1128-E” hyperlink under “Case 
Number”) (last visited Jan. 23, 2016). 
 15.  In 2007, Paul W. Leech was publicly reprimanded for violating Rule 1.01 
(competence) of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct for failing to attend a hearing while 
also failing to notify his client of the hearing, which resulted in a default judgment against his 
client. Disciplinary Actions, 70 TEX. B.J. 726, 730 (2007).  
 16.  See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that defense 
counsel slept through major portions of the trial, but no disciplinary hearings or claims were 
brought against the attorney for seventeen years). By the time the Fifth Circuit found counsel 
ineffective, seventeen years after the original trial, counsel was already deceased. But in that 
seventeen-year period, there is no record of any disciplinary hearings or claims against that 
attorney. It was also not the first time counsel had fallen asleep during a trial. See David R. 
Dow, The State, the Death Penalty and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV. 691, 693–95 (1996). For 
a discussion of cases of ineffective assistance of counsel post Wiggins v. Smith, see Teresa L. 
Norris, Summaries of Published Successful Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Post-Wiggins 
v. Smith, CAP. DEF. NETWORK (Jul. 26, 2013), https://www.capdefnet.org/ 
hat/ uploadedFiles/ Public/ Helpful_ Cases/ Ineffective_ Assistance_ of_ Counsel/ IAC%20 PostWi
ggins%20 72613.pdf. 
 17.  See Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. 13-04 para. 16 (Sept. 30, 2013) (Tenney, 
dissenting) (“The Utah Bar Journal publishes a monthly summary of all attorneys who have 
been professionally disciplined. I have reviewed those summaries for the past five years and 
cannot find a single instance in which a criminal defense lawyer was sanctioned because a court 
had concluded that he was ineffective under the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 18.  Id. para. 15. 
 19.  See Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 
MD. L. REV. 1433, 1472 (1999) (quoting Stephen B. Bright, Glimpses at a Dream Yet to Be 
Realized, CHAMPION, Mar. 1998, at 65). 
 20.  GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 135 (2004). 
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lack of any remedy against ineffective counsel. Part III develops the 
issues that Strickland raised and discusses the lack of any real or 
substantive repercussions against a constitutionally deficient attorney, 
explores the reasons why that is, and discusses why a remedy beyond 
that of a new trial is important. Part III also discusses why the 
available “remedies”—the fear of malpractice claims or the fear of 
harming professional reputation—are unrealistic, difficult to prove, 
and unlikely to affect an attorney’s performance. Part IV then 
examines the beginning of the solution and the central thesis—that a 
violation of Strickland is a violation of the Model Rules. To arrive at 
this conclusion, this Comment first explores the link between a 
defendant’s right to effective assistance and a lawyer’s duty under the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, it looks at how 
courts have used the Model Rules to define the Strickland standard 
itself. As a result of that link, Part V suggests a solution—make it a 
mandatory requirement to report an attorney to the bar when a 
court finds that counsel has been constitutionally deficient. Part 
VI concludes. 
II. STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON—THE BEGINNING OF 
THE PROBLEM 
To understand how ineffective assistance of counsel is applied 
today and why ineffective attorneys face no real repercussions, it is 
first necessary to understand the seminal case that defined the rule 
for determining ineffective assistance—Strickland v. Washington. In 
Strickland, David Leroy Washington planned and committed three 
groups of gruesome crimes including three brutal stabbings, 
murders, torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, 
attempted extortion, and theft.21 But against the advice of his court 
appointed attorney, William Tunkey,22 Washington confessed to the 
first two murders, waived his right to a jury trial, and pleaded guilty 
to all charges.23 As a result, Tunkey “experienced a sense of 
hopelessness.”24 After Washington pleaded guilty, his counsel further 
advised him to invoke his right under Florida law to an advisory jury 
 
 21.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671–72 (1984). 
 22.  Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1247 (5th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984). 
 23.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672. 
 24.  Id. 
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at his capital sentencing hearing.25 But again, Washington rejected 
the advice and waived the right.26 
All Tunkey did to prepare for the sentencing hearing was to 
speak a single time with Washington’s mother and wife on the 
telephone after making one unsuccessful effort to meet with them.27 
But he did not otherwise seek out character witnesses, request a 
psychiatric examination, or look for further evidence concerning 
Washington’s character or emotional state.28 The judge sentenced 
Washington to death on each of the three counts of murder along 
with prison terms for the other crimes.29 
On appeal and in collateral proceedings Washington challenged 
his counsel’s assistance in several respects.30 He asserted various 
claims of ineffective assistance and “submitted 14 affidavits from 
friends, neighbors, and relatives, stating that they would have 
testified if asked to do so.”31 He also submitted a psychiatric report 
and a psychological report, both of which stated that Washington 
was “chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic 
dilemma” when the crimes were committed.32 
The Supreme Court denied Washington relief. In doing this, the 
Court also established the now well-recognized two-part test for 
determining whether an attorney was so ineffective and incompetent 
as to have violated a defendant’s constitutional rights. First, the 
defendant must have shown that his “counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.”33 Second, the Court 
 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See id. at 672–73. One scholar has even suggested that “counsel did virtually 
nothing with respect to the sentencing hearing.” William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s 
Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 91, 115 (1995). 
 28.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673. 
 29.  Id. at 675. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 675–76. 
 33.  Id. at 688. The Court also stated that in determining the objective standard of 
reasonableness, the “benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the 
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686. Further, the Court 
stated that this would require a showing “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. 
at 687. 
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stated that the “defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.”34 Applying this standard, the Court held 
that Tunkey’s strategy choices were within the range of 
professionally reasonable judgments and the choice not to seek more 
character evidence was reasonable.35 The Court went on to say that 
there was no reasonable probability that the evidence the defendant 
said his trial counsel should have offered would have altered the 
outcome of the trial and sentencing hearing.36 
Washington was executed July 13, 1984, two months after 
the decision.37 
William Tunkey continued to practice.38 Tunkey’s name was 
never even mentioned in the Supreme Court decision.39 As far as the 
author can tell, no malpractice claims or formal complaints against 
Tunkey were ever filed.40 Thus began the days of Strickland. And its 
critics.41 But while many have criticized the standard itself in that it 
 
 34.  Id. at 687. In other words, the defendant had to show that his “counsel’s errors 
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. 
 35.  Id. at 699. 
 36.  Id. at 699–700. 
 37.  Killer Apologizes Before His Execution, TELEGRAPH, July 13, 1984, at 21, 
http://news.google.com/ newspapers? nid= 2209&dat= 19840713&id= ZqcrAAAAIBAJ&sjid= 
9vwFAAAAIBAJ&pg= 6811,2282489.  
 38.  William R. Tunkey, ROBBINS TUNKEY ROSS ANSEL RABEN & WAXMAN P.A. (June 
19, 2014), http://www.crimlawfirm.com/ employee/ william-r-tunkey/. 
 39.  Compare Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, with Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 
1247 (5th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 40.  William R Tunkey, FLA. B., http://www.floridabar.org/ wps/ portal/ flbar/ home/ 
 attysearch/ mprofile/! ut/ p/ a1/ jc_ LDoIwEAXQT-pthRaWo6mkRazxgdCNYUWaKLowfr_ 
 42LioOrtJzs3cYZ41zA_ dLfTdNZyH7vjYvTxACM3dBrawxEHlOl3ZqgSEHEE7girnxJMMN 
ktoDlO r 2 qgtF7RM_ 8sjMoRf-T3zn8RJNQO5BXKtp0AxeYNIRTj-HTx_ eJ2Il7ycdg2C6e8_ 
 WXgh/ dl5/ d5/ L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSE h/? mid= 125153 (last visited Aug. 31, 2015). 
 41.  See, e.g., Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: Indigent Defense and Effective 
Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435, 441 (2004) (“If there is a problem with the Strickland 
analysis, it is that the test fails to assure even a minimal level of competence or effectiveness.”); 
Jimmy E. Tinsley, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, in 5 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 267 § 2 
(1975) (“One judge, in harshly criticizing the standard, has suggested various reasons for the 
reluctance of appellate courts to adopt a more realistic standard of effectiveness. Among these 
reasons are the belief that if truly effective assistance were required, half the cases on appeal 
would require reversal, there would not be enough competent lawyers to provide effective 
assistance, and the court system would grind to a halt.”); Kelly Green, “There’s Less in This 
Than Meets the Eye”: Why Wiggins Doesn’t Fix Strickland and What the Court Should Do 
Instead, 29 VT. L. REV. 647, 647 (2005) (“Criticism of Strickland appeared as soon as the ink 
of the opinion dried and continues today . . . .”); Bennett L. Gershman, Judicial Interference 
with Effective Assistance of Counsel, 31 PACE L. REV. 560, 560 (2011) (“However, the standard 
for ‘effective assistance’ in defending a client is complex and controversial.”). 
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creates an almost impossible hurdle for defendants to overcome, few 
have addressed the hidden issue—one Strickland also failed to 
address—what happens to an attorney who is found 
constitutionally ineffective.42 
III. INEFFECTIVE ATTORNEYS FACE NO REAL REPERCUSSIONS 
As the system stands, a criminal defendant has no real remedy 
against an attorney who has violated his Sixth Amendment right. As 
one Assistant Attorney General in Utah stated, “If a defendant 
demonstrates that his trial counsel was ineffective, the defendant 
does not receive anything from the lawyer as a remedy. Rather, what 
the defendant receives is a reversal of his criminal conviction or 
sentence.”43 Certainly, no reasonable attorney would want to be 
found constitutionally ineffective, especially after having put in the 
substantial amount of time, effort, and resources required to defend 
a client. But the increasing number of successful ineffective assistance 
claims demonstrates that whatever reasons attorneys currently may 
have to not be found ineffective are not enough to have any 
actual impact.44 
This Part begins by establishing that there is no real remedy 
against the ineffective attorney beyond that of a new trial. Further, it 
will explore how the available “remedies” of malpractice claims, 
harm to professional reputation, and court sanctions are not realistic 
and are difficult to prove.45 Next, this Part will discuss the increase in 
ineffective assistance claims, the increase in their success, and possible 
explanations for that increase. Following that discussion, it will then 
explore why a remedy is needed as well as the many problems that 
arise because of the lack of a remedy. These problems include an 
 
 42.  Few scholars have addressed the issue or repercussions against the attorney. 
However, some scholars have at least mentioned it in passing. See Susan P. Koniak, Through the 
Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 
9–10 (1995) (“The lawyer may experience some degree of humiliation, assuming peers read 
the court decision reversing the defendant’s conviction. But that is it.”); see also Paul J. Kelly, 
Jr., Are We Prepared to Offer Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 1093 
(2001) (citing several examples where counsel “failed to prepare any strategy, arguments were 
incoherent and that the lawyers failed to attend hearings and call witnesses” and stating that 
“[t]o the extent that this is true, what is startling is that convictions and death sentences were 
all affirmed and no one said or did a thing about the lawyers involved”). 
 43.  Utah State Bar, supra note 17, para. 10 (emphasis added). 
 44.  See infra Section III.B.  
 45.  See infra Section III.C. 
RICKS.AA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2016  5:22 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1122 
increase in frivolous claims, a decrease in professional norms due to 
attorneys falling on their sword, and a rise in ineffective attorneys 
who continue to practice. Finally, this Part will explore possible 
reasons for a lack of any real repercussion from the state bar. 
A. No Real Remedy Exists 
Today, there are no real repercussions or remedies against the 
constitutionally ineffective attorney. As one scholar has noted: 
Assuming the criminal defendant succeeds in securing a new trial, 
having shown that the lawyer was so negligent that even 
Strickland’s presumptions could not whitewash the incompetence, 
how do the courts deal with the lawyer? Is malpractice presumed? 
Is the lawyer automatically subject to some disciplinary action? Is 
the attorney required to undergo continuing peer review and 
supervision? Is the lawyer barred from handling criminal cases or 
required to attend classes? Anything? No.46 
To be sure, some have disagreed and claimed that there are 
repercussions and remedies against the ineffective attorney. These so-
called “repercussions” come in three forms: harm to the attorney’s 
professional reputation, legal malpractice claims, and court sanctions. 
But as discussed below, none of these “repercussions” are effective 
or realistic. 
The first claimed “repercussion” is that the attorney who is 
declared constitutionally ineffective may face humiliation and his 
professional reputation may be harmed.47 That “harm” to the 
attorney’s reputation may take several forms including losing 
credibility in front of the judge who finds them ineffective or 
possibly losing credibility in front of that judge’s colleagues. On the 
other hand, it may take the form of embarrassment in the presence 
of other attorneys who may be aware of the court’s finding of 
ineffectiveness. As a result, the ineffective attorney may lose clients, 
social standing, and prestige. Thus it is claimed that these 
professional consequences would deter an attorney from giving sub-
standard legal assistance to a criminal defendant. 
 
 46.  Koniak, supra note 42, at 9. 
 47.  Lawrence J. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful: Predecessor Counsel’s Ethical 
Duty to the Capital Defendant, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181, 1191 (2003) (stating that when 
defense counsel is found ineffective he will “suffer the ignominy and shame that follows”). 
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However, the idea that losing an ineffective assistance claim 
harms the attorney’s reputation is implausible. It rests on the 
assumption that peers will read the court decision,48 but it also 
assumes that anyone reading the decision could identify the defense 
lawyer who had been accused of being ineffective. Yet, it is not the 
practice of appellate courts to publicly identify defense lawyers in 
written decisions.49 In fact, one survey of Tenth Circuit opinions over 
a five-year period showed that hundreds of opinions were issued in 
criminal cases, but only between three and five of the opinions a year 
ever named the trial lawyer as part of an ineffective assistance claim.50 
Another claimed “repercussion” is the possibility of the 
defendant filing a malpractice claim against his counsel. The fear of a 
malpractice suit would arguably deter a defense attorney from 
unprofessionally representing a client. But while fear of malpractice 
may have some minimal impact on an attorney’s behavior, it is not a 
realistic remedy. Eighty percent of defendants in criminal cases do 
not have funds to hire a defense attorney.51 Thus it is idealistic to 
assume that after years of trial and appeals a defendant would have 
the funds or even be willing to hire a civil attorney, pay court fees, 
attorney fees, and risk losing simply to file a malpractice claim. But 
even if a civil attorney takes a malpractice claim on a contingency 
fee,52 winning is unrealistic. Many states have granted public 
defenders qualified immunity from suit for acts or omissions made in 
the course of “executing their official duties” regardless of whether 
the attorney had been found ineffective.53 
 
 48.  Koniak, supra note 42, at 9–10. 
 49.  Ethics Advisory Opinion 13-04, supra note 17, paras. 14–15. 
 50.  Id. para. 14. 
 51.  Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, The Right to Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2013/ 03/ 10/ opinion/ sunday/ the-right-to-
counsel-badly-battered-at-50.html (finding that “at least 80 percent of state criminal 
defendants cannot afford to pay for lawyers and have to depend on court-appointed counsel”). 
 52.  One website notes that when an attorney charges a contingency fee for legal 
malpractice claims, it is usually between forty and fifty percent. This is much higher than other 
types of negligence cases because of the difficulty in proving malpractice. Suing Your Lawyer, 
LAWYERS.COM, http://legal-malpractice.lawyers.com/ suing-your-lawyer.html (last visited Jan. 
23, 2016).  
 53.  Harold H. Chen, Malpractice Immunity: An Illegitimate and Ineffective Response to 
the Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45 DUKE L.J. 783, 784, 806 (1996) (stating that several states 
“shield indigent-defense attorneys from malpractice suits brought by their indigent clients”); 
see also Mooney v. Frazier, 693 S.E.2d 333, 345 (W. Va. 2010) (“[A]n attorney appointed by a 
federal court to represent a criminal defendant, in a federal criminal prosecution in West 
Virginia, has absolute immunity from purely state law claims of legal malpractice that derive 
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A further difficulty to any civil malpractice suit as a result of a 
criminal case is that the majority of courts also require proof of 
“actual innocence.”54 Some states have even gone far enough to state 
that a legal malpractice claim cannot succeed unless “the person’s 
conviction has been reversed, whether on appeal or through post-
conviction relief, or the person otherwise has been exonerated.”55 
Thus, even if an attorney has been declared constitutionally deficient, 
if the conviction holds, the defendant has no real remedy for a 
deficient attorney. 
One last possible “remedy” would be the court imposing 
sanctions on the ineffective attorney.56 When a judge receives 
information that indicates a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has 
committed a violation of the rules, he may take “appropriate action” 
against that attorney.57 Many courts’ local rules are similar.58 As a 
result, courts enjoy broad discretion when it comes to determining 
who may practice before them as well as regulating the conduct of 
those who appear before them.59 This power is inherent within the 
courts.60 Thus, along with specific statutes that grant authority,61 
 
from the attorney’s conduct in the underlying criminal proceedings.”); Coyazo v. State, 897 
P.2d 234, 238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing state statutes that “provide complete 
immunity from suit”). 
 54.  See Wiley v. Cnty. of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 985 (Cal. 1998) (citing cases where 
states have required “actual innocence” before filing a malpractice claim). 
 55.  Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 561 (Or. 1993). 
 56.  For example, in the case of In re Warren, 321 F. App’x 369, 370 (5th Cir. 2009), 
the court issued sanctions after granting relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. 
 57.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(D) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
 58.  See, e.g., Local Crim. R. N.D. Tex. 57.8(b), http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/ 
pdf/ CRIMRULES.pdf (“A presiding judge, after giving opportunity to show cause to the 
contrary, may take any appropriate disciplinary action against a member of the bar for: (1) 
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar; (2) failure to comply with any rule or order of this 
court . . . .”); D.U. R. Practice Civ. R. 83-1.5.1(b), (stating that the court may initiate 
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys accused of a violation of an ethical or professional 
standard of conduct.). 
 59.  See United States v. Nolen, 472 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 60.  Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing In re 
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643–44 (1985) (“It is beyond dispute that a federal court may suspend 
or dismiss an attorney as an exercise of the court’s inherent powers.”); accord Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (recognizing the inherent power of the court to 
impose sanctions when “neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task”). 
 61.  See RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 
11:4 (2015 ed.) (“A federal court’s power to sanction also arises out of the legislative grant to 
promulgate its own rules.”); see also Waguespack v. Halipoto, 633 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. App. 
1982) (“The Rules provide a trial judge with the tools to facilitate the litigation of lawsuits 
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courts impose sanctions for various offenses including improper 
certification,62 improper claims and motions,63 filing frivolous 
appeals,64 and misbehavior,65 among others.66 The sanctions 
themselves may include forcing the attorney to give up the fee he 
received to represent the client,67 imposing restitution,68 limiting the 
attorney’s practice,69 or requiring the attorney to take remedial 
classes on how to be an effective attorney.70 But in practice, rarely, if 
ever, are attorneys sanctioned after being found constitutionally 
deficient.71 In fact, in one study over five years in Utah, the courts 
did not sanction a single attorney who had been found ineffective 
under the Sixth Amendment.72 
 
and, to a certain extent, to prevent abuse of the legal process. This discretion is therefore 
appropriately broad.”). 
 62.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) (“If a certification violates this rule without substantial 
justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the 
signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an 
order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the violation.”). 
 63.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). Rule 11(c)(3) also notes that the court may bring these 
claims on its own initiative. 
 64. See United States v. Najera-Gandara, 438 F. App’x 338 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that 
filing frivolous appeals “may subject counsel to sanctions”). Courts have also recognized that 
sanctions for filing frivolous appeals should only apply in egregious cases so as not to chill the 
right to appeal. See Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
 65.  See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012) (granting a court power to punish by fine or 
imprisonment for contempt of its authority, including misbehavior). 
 66.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A) (violating disclosure rules); FED. R. CRIM. P. 
16(d)(2) (failure to comply). 
 67.  For example, in In re Warren, 321 F. App’x 369, 371 (5th Cir. 2009), the court 
disbarred counsel and required him to disgorge the $3,500 fee he received to represent 
the defendant. 
 68.  UTAH CTS. JUD. COUNCIL R. JUD. ADMIN. R. 14-603(i)(1), 
https://www.utcourts.gov/ resources/ rules/ ucja/ view.html? rule= ch14/ 06%20 Standards%20 f
or%20 Lawyer%20 Sanctions/ USB14-603.html. 
 69.  Id. R. 14-603(i)(3). 
 70.  In re Hawver, 339 P.3d 573, 586 (Kan. 2014) (noting how an attorney and the 
respondent participated in the attorney diversion program, under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 
203(d), for having violated Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (competence)); see also 
KAN. SUP. CT. R. 203(d) (allowing courts to enroll incompetent counsel into an Attorney 
Diversion Program). “The purpose of the program is to protect the public by improving the 
professional competency of, and providing educational, remedial, and rehabilitative programs 
for, the members of the bar of Kansas.” Id. 
 71.  See Jonathan H. Adler, When Ineffective Assistance Becomes Malpractice, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 5, 2009, 9:47 AM), http://volokh.com/ 2009/ 11/ 05/ when-ineffective-
assistance-becomes-malpractice/ (stating that “it is rare that defense attorneys are sanctioned 
for providing inadequate assistance”). 
 72.  See supra note 17. 
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In sum, professional reputation, malpractice claims, and court 
sanctions are ineffective and unrealistic as remedies because they do 
not really affect the ineffective attorney. Thus, an attorney faces no 
repercussions for violating his client’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
B. The Increase in Successful IAC Claims 
The sharp increase in ineffective assistance claims as well as the 
increase in constitutionally deficient attorneys further demonstrates 
the need for a remedy. Today, ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
are the most frequently filed claim in both federal and state post-
conviction proceedings.73 And the number of ineffective assistance 
claims is rising.74 As “such claims have become more and more 
prevalent, claims about other constitutional deprivations have fallen 
by the wayside,”75 causing scholars to suggest that these claims 
predominate because petitioners “perceive[] that courts are receptive 
to them.”76 To be sure, because the bar has been set so low, it is not 
difficult for an attorney to meet the Strickland standard. Not 
surprisingly then, in relation to how many claims are filed, only a 
relative few actually succeed.77 For example, the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming noted that between 1986 and 1993, only three cases were 
overturned because of ineffective assistance of counsel.78 And in 
another study of ineffective assistance claims from California, New 
York, Texas, and Alabama, it was demonstrated that “although 
defendants raised ineffective assistance of counsel in 41% of state 
post-conviction petitions in the targeted years of 1990 and 1992, 
state courts granted relief in only 8% of the cases.”79 
 
 73.  Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas 
Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1118 
(1999). Further, reports have stated that “‘ineffective assistance of counsel’ was the most 
frequently cited reason for habeas corpus petitions filed by State inmates.” Id. 
 74.  Tom Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 S.C. L. REV. 425, 
433 (2011). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 449. 
 77.  See Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 
2428, 2431 n.10 (2013) (noting that in a survey of 3,605 federal habeas petitions from 2005 
to 2010 in Michigan, only 100 were granted relief, 45 of those were because of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and of that 45, 17 of those that had granted relief were overturned on 
appeal or, in other words, a success rate of 1.3%). 
 78.  Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 693 n.5 (Wyo. 1993). 
 79.  Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 684 n.23 (2007) (citing Victor E. 
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But these numbers are dramatically changing in some states. For 
example, in Utah during the seven-year period between 1998 and 
2005, there were only a total of two reported cases where the courts 
reversed for ineffective assistance.80 However, in the following seven-
year period between 2006 and 2013, the Utah courts found that an 
attorney’s conduct was both prejudicial and constitutionally deficient 
in at least fifteen cases.81 Similarly, in Kansas, in the period between 
1984 and 2003, there were only a total of three reported cases 
where the courts reversed for ineffective assistance.82 But in the 
following ten-year period between 2004 and 2014, the Kansas 
courts found that an attorney’s conduct was both prejudicial and 
deficient in at least fourteen cases.83 One of the most impressive 
increases comes from the state of Washington. Between 1982 and 
1992, there were only four successful claims of ineffective 
assistance.84 But in the following ten years, between 1993 and 2003, 
that number increased to fourteen successful claims.85 And in the 
 
Flango & Patricia McKenna, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 31 
CAL. W. L. REV. 237, 247 tbl.4, 259 tbl.12 (1995)). 
 80.  See State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 382 (Utah 1999); State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d 
1243, 1249 (Utah 2000). 
 81.  See State v. Larrabee, 321 P.3d 1136, 1146 (Utah 2013); Gregg v. State, 279 P.3d 
396 (Utah 2012); State v. Moore, 289 P.3d 487 (Utah 2012); State v. Ott, 247 P.3d 344 
(Utah 2010); Housekeeper v. State, 197 P.3d 636 (Utah 2008); State v. Eyre, 179 P.3d 792 
(Utah 2007); State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321 (Utah 2007); Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 
(Utah 2006); State v. Ekstrom, 316 P.3d 435, 444 (Utah Ct. App. 2013); State v. Charles, 
263 P.3d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); State v. Fowers, 265 P.3d 832 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); 
State v. Sellers, 248 P.3d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); State v. King, 248 P.3d 984 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2010); State v. Moore, 223 P.3d 1137 (Utah Ct. App. 2009); State v. Perez-Avila, 131 
P.3d 864 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
 82.  State v. Washington, 68 P.3d 134 (Kan. 2003); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138 (Kan. 
2000); Mullins v. State, 46 P.3d 1222 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). 
 83.  Miller v. State, 318 P.3d 155, 164 (Kan. 2014); State v. Brooks, 305 P.3d 634, 
636–37 (Kan. 2013); State v. Cheatham, 292 P.3d 318 (Kan. 2013); In re Ontiberos, 287 
P.3d 855 (Kan. 2012); Albright v. State, 251 P.3d 52 (Kan. 2011); State v. Stovall, 312 P.3d 
1271, 1273 (Kan. 2009); State v. Overstreet, 200 P.3d 427 (Kan. 2009); State v. Hemphill, 
186 P.3d 777 (Kan. 2008); State v. Patton, 195 P.3d 753 (Kan. 2008); Laymon v. State, 122 
P.3d 326 (Kan. 2005); State v. Davis, 85 P.3d 1164 (Kan. 2004); Wilson v. State, 340 P.3d 
1213, 1230 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); Shumway v. State, 293 P.3d 772 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) 
King v. State, 154 P.3d 545 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). 
 84.  See State v. Thomas, 743 P.2d 816 (Wash. 1987) (en banc); State v. Tarica, 798 
P.2d 296 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Carter, 783 P.2d 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Matter 
of Frampton, 726 P.2d 486 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). 
 85.  See In re Brett, 16 P.3d 601 (Wash. 2001); In re Fleming, 16 P.3d 610 (Wash. 
2001) (en banc); State v. Aho, 975 P.2d 512 (Wash. 1999); In re Maxfield, 945 P.2d 196 
(Wash. 1997) (en banc); State v. Horton, 68 P.3d 1145 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); State v. 
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next ten years, between 2004 and 2014, the numbers jumped to 
over twenty-nine successful claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.86 This same pattern is seen in several other states ranging 
from California87 to Alabama.88 
 
Shaver, 65 P.3d 688 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Lopez, 27 P.3d 237 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2001), aff’d on other grounds, 55 P.3d 609 (Wash. 2002); State v. Wicker, 20 P.3d 1007 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001); State v. S.M., 996 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Klinger, 
980 P.2d 282 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Klinger, 980 P.2d 282 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); 
State v. Saunders, 958 P.2d 364 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Doogan, 917 P.2d 155 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1996); State v. Stowe, 858 P.2d 267 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
 86.  See In re Morris, 288 P.3d 1140 (Wash. 2012) (en banc); State v. Cardwell, 257 
P.3d 1114 (Wash. 2011); State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015 (Wash. 2011); State v. A.N.J., 225 
P.3d 956 (Wash. 2010) (en banc); State v. Kyllo, 215 P.3d 177 (Wash. 2009) (en banc); State 
v. Sutherby, 204 P.3d 916 (Wash. 2009) (en banc); State v. Thiefault, 158 P.3d 580 (Wash. 
2007) (en banc); In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Dalluge, 100 P.3d 279 (Wash. 2004) (en 
banc); In re Davis, 101 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2004) (en banc); In re Orange, 100 P.3d 291 (Wash. 
2004) (en banc); State v. Reichenbach, 101 P.3d 80 (Wash. 2004) (en banc); State v. Fedoruk, 
339 P.3d 233, 242 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014); State v. Hamilton, 320 P.3d 142 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2014); State v. Hassan, 336 P.3d 99, 105 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014); In re D’Allesandro, 314 
P.3d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Phuong, 299 P.3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013); In re 
Wilson, 279 P.3d 990 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Martinez, 253 P.3d 445 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2011); State v. Adamy, 213 P.3d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); In re Pers. Restraint 
Petition of Crawford, 209 P.3d 507 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Powell, 206 P.3d 703 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Smith, 223 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); In re 
Dependency of G.A.R., 150 P.3d 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Hendrickson, 158 P.3d 
1257 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 198 P.3d 1029 (Wash. 2009); In re 
Hubert, 158 P.3d 1282 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Horton, 146 P.3d 1227 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2006); State v. Meckelson, 135 P.3d 991 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Pittman, 166 
P.3d 720 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Saunders, 86 P.3d 232 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 87.  California’s successful ineffective assistance claims increased from six reported cases 
between 1993 and 2003 to fourteen reported cases between 2004 and 2014. See In re Hardy, 
163 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2007); In re Lucas, 94 P.3d 477 (Cal. 2004); In re Sanders, 981 P.2d 
1038 (Cal. 1999); In re Jones, 917 P.2d 1175 (Cal. 1996); In re Neely, 864 P.2d 474 (Cal. 
1993); People v. Hussain, 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 686 (Ct. App. 2014); People v. Speight, 174 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 469 (Ct. App. 2014); In re Brown, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 822, 824 (Ct. App. 
2013); People v. Smith, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Ct. App. 2013); In re Hill, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
856 (Ct. App. 2011); People v. Roberts, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810 (Ct. App. 2011); People v. 
Peyton, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243 (Ct. App. 2009); In re Edward S., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 725 (Ct. 
App. 2009); People v. Gayton, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Le, 39 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 146 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Thimmes, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 925 (Ct. App. 2006); 
People v. Callahan, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 226 (Ct. App. 2004); People v. Donaldson, 113 Cal. 
Rept. 2d 548 (Ct. App. 2001); People v. Burnett, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629 (Ct. App. 
1999);People v. Denison, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 88.  In Alabama, successful claims of ineffective assistance of counsel increased from five 
between 1993 and 2003, to twelve between 2004 and 2014. See Ex parte Pierce, 851 So. 2d 
618 (Ala. 2002); State v. Ziegler, 159 So. 3d 96, 104 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014); Frost v. State, 
76 So. 3d 862 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); Stith v. State, 76 So. 3d 286 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); 
State v. Gamble, 63 So. 3d 707 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); State v. Smith, 85 So. 3d 1063 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 2010); Powers v. State, 38 So. 3d 764 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009); McCombs v. State, 
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There are several possible reasons for the increase in successful 
ineffective assistance claims. A pessimist might say that attorneys are 
just getting worse. To be sure, over the years scholars have argued 
that often many indigent defendants do not receive effective 
assistance.89 Indeed some scholars have estimated that from one-
third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in court are not qualified 
to render the assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.90 But 
bad lawyering is nothing new and cannot reasonably explain the 
large increases over several different states.91 Other possible reasons 
to explain the increase in successful claims may include that courts 
are simply misinterpreting Strickland or that new judges are 
appointed with more lenient ideas of what makes up Strickland’s 
“prevailing professional norms.” But again, the fact that in the past 
twenty years the number of successful ineffective assistance claims is 
almost universally rising would seem to demonstrate that a newly 
appointed judge would not be the only answer.92 
But regardless of the reason, the sharp increase in successful 
ineffective assistance claims illustrates the need for society to have 
some remedy against the ineffective attorney—more than what 
currently exists. With the increase in successful claims and with no 
remedy against the deficient attorney, outcomes become less accurate 
and society loses confidence in the system. It has been said that the 
adversarial system assumes that “the truth can be served best only if 
each side is represented by a competent attorney.”93 But what if one 
 
3 So. 3d 950 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); Nickens v. State, 981 So. 2d 1165 (Ala. Crim. App. 
2007); Reeves v. State, 974 So. 2d 314 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Hamlet, 913 So. 2d 
493 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Bargeron v. State, 895 So. 2d 385 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Cobb 
v. State, 895 So. 2d 1044 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Strickland v. State, 771 So. 2d 1123 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1999); Grace v. State, 683 So. 2d 17 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Williams, 
679 So. 2d 275 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); Walker v. State, 684 So. 2d 170 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1996).  
 89.  Primus, supra note 79, at 684 n.23 (citing David L. Bazelon, The Defective 
Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973) (“[A] great many—if not most—
indigent defendants do not receive the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed them by the 
6th Amendment.”)).  
 90.  See id. (citing Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized 
Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 227, 234 (1973) (stating that “from one-third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in 
the serious cases are not really qualified to render fully adequate representation” and some 
judges have even claimed that number is “as high as 75 percent”)). 
 91.  See Burger, supra, note 90 at 234.  
 92.  See supra notes 80–88.  
 93.  Kelly, supra note 42, at 1096. 
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side is represented by a terrible and incompetent attorney? Will the 
truth really come out? A further issue is that, like the attorney in 
Aldrich,94 there is nothing to stop the attorney from acting 
incompetently again. As a result, society loses confidence in 
the system. 
C. The Problems with No Real Remedy 
The problems created by a lack of any repercussions and any real 
deterrent include that the State is overburdened with frivolous 
claims, outcomes become less reliable because of defense counsel 
falling on his sword, and inadequate counsel continues to offer 
inadequate assistance. 
First, one of the major problems with a lack of repercussion 
against the “ineffective” attorney is that there is no deterrent for 
filing a frivolous claim against that attorney. Ineffective assistance of 
counsel is the most common issue raised in habeas petitions and a 
non-habeas appeal is a “very common—if not the most common—
claim for relief.”95 Yet only a fraction of those claims actually win.96 
The ninety-two percent fail-rate for ineffective assistance claims 
illustrates that there are many attorneys filing frivolous claims.97 
A further negative outcome of not having any real repercussions 
against the offending attorney comes in the form of defense counsel 
“falling on its sword” with no fear of any professional consequences. 
Falling on the sword refers to the tactic of trial counsel admitting 
and then arguing that they were constitutionally ineffective in order 
to have their client receive a new trial.98 And this tactic is well known 
 
 94.  See supra Part I. 
 95.  Aaron K. Friess, Soothsaying with a Foggy Crystal Ball: A Critique of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Remedy for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When a Criminal Defendant 
Rejects a Plea Bargain [Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012)], 52 WASHBURN L.J. 147, 
168 (2012); see also supra notes 34–36. 
 96.  See Primus, supra note 79, at 682 n.13; State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d 1243, 1249 
(Utah 2000); State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 382 (Utah 1999). 
 97.  See supra note 81. 
 98.  See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995) (“To support 
this conclusion, Hendricks cites Berman’s admission at the evidentiary hearing that he would 
have presented Dr. Carson’s testimony in the guilt phase if he had done a more thorough 
investigation.”); Boyle v. United States, No. 13 Cv. 7958(CM), 2014 WL 1744256, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2014) (“Boyle’s motion is supported by self-critical affidavits from his three 
trial attorneys: Marc Fernich, Martin Geduldig and Diarmuid White; each attorney falling on 
his sword—claiming that the failure to pursue the statute of limitation defenses was not 
strategic, but oversight.”). 
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to judges.99 But even though it has been heavily criticized,100 there 
are still those who support and even encourage this practice.101 As a 
result, because counsel suffers few if any consequences for being 
declared ineffective or constitutionally deficient, attorneys may “see 
no harm in”102 or “even see it as their duty”103 to “fall on 
their sword.” 
But regardless of whether this is a commendable practice, this 
tactic has a negative impact on ineffective assistance jurisprudence by 
seriously distorting what in fact makes an attorney “ineffective.”104 In 
other words, counsel who otherwise would be found competent, are 
found incompetent because they admit ineffectiveness in order to 
help out a client.105 The effect is that our jurisprudence fills up with 
what Judge Kozinski labeled “descriptions of perfectly adequate 
performance that is assumed to be deficient.”106 
 
 99.  See Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 701 n.10 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (describing the act of falling on one’s sword as “something trial counsel are known 
to do to help their clients on habeas”), rev’d sub nom. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 
(2011); see also Schmitt v. State, 779 A.2d 1004, 1012 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (criticizing 
defense counsel for “falling on his sword” and being “unduly self-abasing”); Becker v. State, 
232 P.3d 376, 379 (Mont. 2010) (Nelson, J. concurring) (“Appellate counsel’s gratuitously 
falling on his sword is self-serving . . . .”); Commonwealth v. McSharry, 942 N.E.2d 1018 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (describing counsel’s affidavit admitting ineffective assistance as “falling 
on his sword”); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1276 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 
remedies for counsel who “in falling on his sword, had admitted he was ineffective”). 
 100.  Gideon, The Sword: Fall on It, PUB. DEFENDER, (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:29 PM) 
http://apublicdefender.com/ 2010/ 10/ 05/ the-sword-fall-on-it/ (advocating defense 
attorneys to admit ineffective assistance in order “to assist our clients in any way possible and 
to remedy any constitutional violation that occurs due to our mishandling of a case”). 
 101.  See Fox, supra note 47, at 1192 (encouraging defense counsel to admit 
wrongdoing “particularly when a recognition of one’s failings may not only make one a better 
lawyer next time around but provide one’s former client with an opportunity to escape a date 
with the executioner”); see also Jeff Gamso, Especially When It’s Hard: Falling on One’s Sword, 
GAMSO – FOR DEF., (July 16, 2014, 12:15 AM), http://gamso-forthedefense.blogspot.com/ 
2014/ 07/ especially-when-its-hard-falling-on.html (advocating that defense attorneys should 
“[f]all on their sword” and “fess up” when they have done “a terrible job”). 
 102.  Pinholster, 590 F.3d at 701 n.10. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id.; see also Kelly, supra note 42, at 1089, 1092 (“In some of these cases, the 
defendant’s trial or appellate counsel will furnish an affidavit essentially admitting the 
allegations, and equally disconcerting is the fact that the allegations, if true, reflect lawyering 
totally devoid of that high sense of public service described by Dean Pound” when he 
described the practice of law as “the pursuit of a learned art, a common calling in the spirit of 
public service, no less a public service because it is incidentally the means of a livelihood.”). 
 106.  Pinholster, 590 F.3d at 701 n.10. 
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A final problem with the lack of repercussions is that counsel may 
continue to represent future defendants and continue to give less 
than effective assistance to those defendants. As Justice Maura D. 
Corrigan from Michigan stated, “[T]o protect future defendants, it 
is important . . . to identify attorneys who may consistently provide 
ineffective assistance, in order to take any appropriate disciplinary 
action.”107 Yet without any real remedy against the incompetent 
counsel, the attorneys, judges, and especially the general public are 
not really aware of the offending attorney’s conduct. Thus the 
“ineffective” attorney will likely represent other clients. And he may 
very well give the same quality of assistance that he previously gave. 
D. Why Are There No Repercussions from the State Bar? 
But why are there no repercussions from the state bar against an 
attorney who has “made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment”?108 There are several possible answers. Among those 
are: (1) the difficulty in creating a one-size-fits-all solution, (2) the 
fear of ruining collegial relationships, and (3) simply a weak and 
underfunded state bar. But each of these explanations fails. 
Ultimately, there are no repercussions from the state bar because no 
one reports ineffective attorneys. 
First, one possible reason that there currently are no 
repercussions from the state bar associations is the difficulty of a one-
size-fits-all solution. There are many different types of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Thus, there may be a difference between what 
has been called “personal ineffectiveness” and “structural 
ineffectiveness.”109 For example, there are the attorneys who fall 
asleep during trial,110 are under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
while representing a client,111 or “are out in the courthouse parking 
lot while key prosecution witnesses testify.”112 On the other hand, 
 
 107.  People v. Henderson, 776 N.W.2d 906, 907 (Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, 
J., concurring). 
 108.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 109.  Primus, supra note 79, at 686. 
 110.  Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 372 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 111.  Gershman, supra note 41 at 560 (“A lawyer who is drunk or sleeping during a trial 
may be unable to render effective advocacy.”). 
 112.  Primus, supra note 79, at 686 (discussing many instances where defendants have 
claimed ineffective assistance). 
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there may be ineffective assistance that comes as a direct result of 
public defender offices that are simply overworked and 
understaffed.113 The argument is that because of the huge caseloads, 
there simply is not enough time to give the attention and effort that 
is necessary to provide the minimal assistance required by the 
Constitution. And in recognition of these “structural” problems, 
courts and legislatures simply turn a blind eye to such problems. 
To be sure, because of these differences, state bars may find it 
difficult to create a blanket one-size-fits-all solution to the problem. 
Neither sanctions, discipline, nor other repercussions may be 
appropriate in every case. But the one-size-fits-all approach has its 
advantages. Whether the attorney fell asleep during trial or was 
simply overworked, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have 
been violated. And in both cases, an attorney has acted so 
incompetently so as to violate that right. 
A second possible reason that there are no real repercussions 
from the state bar against an ineffective attorney is that attorneys and 
judges may feel that if they report another attorney, it would 
interfere with their professional relationships. As one scholar noted, 
“Lawyers may fear being considered a tattletale by their peers within 
the legal community.”114 Of course there may be the occasional 
attorney who would be happy to report certain defense attorneys, 
but because in many respects lawyers depend on their reputation 
within the community and among members of the bar, the potential 
negative effects of “being labeled a snitch” could cause many 
problems in their professional lives.115 These problems may include 
collateral effects in subsequent cases that involve the “ineffective” 
attorney. If one attorney has reported another, it is possible, and 
even likely, that the reported attorney would feel hostile towards 
the other. 
 
 113.  See Indigent Defense, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS (Dec. 2011), 
http://ojp.gov/ newsroom/ factsheets/ ojpfs_ indigentdefense.html (citing a study that found 
that in 2007, 964 public defender offices nationwide received nearly 6 million indigent defense 
cases); see also Voigts, supra note 73, at 1119 (“Court-appointed lawyers are often under-
experienced and over-burdened, and frequently the measures courts have adopted to address 
both those problems have not been particularly successful.”). 
 114.  Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, A Current Look at Model Rule 8.3: How Is It 
Used and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 752 (2003). 
 115.  Id. at 753; see also Primus, supra note 79, at 732 (“Whatever the reason, members 
of the Bar seldom report instances of attorney misconduct.”). 
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But while reporting might carry some social and professional 
costs, and even may be uncomfortable to do, “the benefits of 
reporting may often outweigh the costs.”116 Reporting ineffective 
attorneys would raise the bar for what is a “reasonable” attorney. 
And assuming the bar did anything after the attorney was reported, 
it would deter attorneys who have been found ineffective from 
continuing to give sub-par assistance to yet another defendant. 
Further, it would increase the public’s faith in other attorneys and 
the system itself. 
The third and most viable reason that there may not be any 
current repercussions against the offending attorney is the inherent 
weaknesses of state bar associations in regulating attorney conduct. 
In fact, over the years there have been many critics of the state bar’s 
capacity to prosecute potential rule violations.117 And although 
attorneys are required to “conform their behavior to these state 
codes,”118 one commentator has noted the following: 
[S]tudy after study has shown that the current rules of professional 
conduct are not enforced. Misconduct is rarely perceived. If 
perceived, it is not reported. If reported, it is not investigated. If 
investigated, violations are not found. If found, they are excused. If 
they are not excused, penalties are light. And if significant penalties 
are imposed, the lawyer soon returns to practice, in that state 
or another.119 
However, at least in theory, a criminal defense attorney’s actions 
and violation of state rules could lead to disciplinary action and 
proceedings to address the alleged misconduct.120 In reality, it does 
not happen.121 But it is unfortunate that it does not happen. The 
 
 116.  See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A 
Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 285 (2003). 
 117.  See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 
639, 649 (1981) (“Lawyers can hardly present their travesty of a penal system as an 
effective deterrent.”). 
 118.  Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and 
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 154 (2009). 
 119.  Abel, supra note 117, at 648–49 (footnotes omitted). 
 120.  Roberts, supra note 118, at 154 (discussing potential sanctions for alleged 
misconduct including sanctions “ranging from ‘no action,’ to private reprimand, 
to disbarment”). 
 121.  Utah State Bar, supra note 17, para. 16 (“The Utah Bar Journal publishes a 
monthly summary of all attorneys who have been professionally disciplined. I have reviewed 
those summaries for the past five years and cannot find a single instance in which a criminal 
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state bar associations seem the ideal place to begin ensuring 
competence among lawyers. State bars already have established rules 
and guidelines for attorney conduct. State bars already have 
established means for enforcing those guidelines. And state bar 
associations are already accessible to anyone—anyone can file a 
claim.122 In fact, state bar associations have even been labeled as “the 
most easily accessible means by which criminal defendants can begin 
to be protected against bad lawyering.”123 And while some critics 
have stated that “state bar associations seem loathe to recommend 
any meaningful sanction,”124 state bar associations impose over 5,600 
sanctions annually.125 But if so many sanctions are imposed each year, 
how is it that the bar association could be perceived as weak? And 
why would ineffective attorneys not be sanctioned? 
One of the major weaknesses of state bars is that the disciplinary 
boards generally rely on complaints before taking action.126 Seldom 
do state bars initiate independent investigations.127 Further, 
defendants file relatively few complaints against trial attorneys in 
 
defense lawyer was sanctioned because a court had concluded that he was ineffective under the 
Sixth Amendment.”). 
 122.  See Office of Professional Conduct Frequently Asked Questions, UTAH ST. B., 
http://www.utahbar.org/ opc/ office-of-professional-conduct-frequently-asked-questions/ 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2016) (complaints may be filed by a member of the public or by the 
Bar itself). 
 123.  Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A 
System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 43 (2002). 
 124.  Roberts, supra note 118, at 154–55. 
 125.  Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1 (2007). While the number of complaints alleged against the 1.3 million lawyers in 
the United States far outnumbers the amount where the state bars actually impose sanctions, 
the fact that many thousands are sanctioned each year illustrates that the bar is not 
totally defunct. 
 126.  David L. Dranoff, Attorney Professional Responsibility: Competence Through 
Malpractice Liability, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 633, 647 (1982) (“[B]oards generally refuse to 
conduct independent investigations, and instead rely almost exclusively on complaints as a basis 
for action. Because the boards take a passive role, the system is dependent on the existence of 
incentives for outside parties to file complaints.”) (footnote omitted). 
 127.  Id. 
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criminal cases.128 And even fewer judges and lawyers 
file complaints.129 
The solution, therefore, rests on establishing a vehicle by which 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can be reported 
and corrected. 
IV. A VIOLATION OF A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE IS A VIOLATION OF A LAWYER’S DUTY UNDER THE 
PROFESSIONAL RULES TO PROVIDE COMPETENT ASSISTANCE. 
The vehicle by which claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
can be reported and corrected comes from the inherent relationship 
between the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct and a defendant’s 
right to effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment. Because of 
that relationship, a violation of Strickland implies a violation of the 
Professional Rules. The idea that there is a link between the two is 
not difficult to see. Nor is the idea novel. In fact, in 1986 even the 
Supreme Court recognized the increasing need to rely on this 
relationship and the potential need to rely more on these standards. 
The Supreme Court stated that in “some future case . . . we may 
need to define with greater precision the weight to be given to 
recognized canons of ethics, the standards established by the state in 
statutes or professional codes, and the Sixth Amendment, in defining 
the proper scope and limits on that conduct.”130 And since that date, 
many courts began to define the scope and limits of effective 
assistance by looking to the canons of ethics and the 
professional codes.131 
 
 128.  Primus, supra note 79, at 700 (“[V]ery few complaints get filed against trial 
attorneys in criminal cases. Judges and other lawyers rarely file complaints, and criminal 
defendants have little incentive to file them, particularly given that defendants are not 
compensated for lodging complaints.”) (footnote omitted). 
 129.  See id.; Dranoff, supra note 126, at 669 n.79 (“A Michigan study indicated that 
members of the legal profession filed 8.1% of complaints and that only 1.8% were filed by 
lawyers who were not involved in some sort of professional relationship with 
the respondent.”). 
 130.  Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165–66 (1986). 
 131.  See infra Section IV.A; see also Ramseyer ex rel. Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 
1239, 1254 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Ramseyer ex rel. Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432 
(9th Cir. 1995) (noting that ABA standards “are regularly used by courts as guidelines in 
determining whether an attorney’s performance falls below reasonable 
professional standards”). 
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This inherent link between the ABA standards and Strickland 
demonstrates that a violation of the defendant’s right to effective 
assistance is also a violation of the professional rules to provide 
competent assistance. This Part will first discuss how over the years 
the ABA Standards have come to define Strickland’s “prevailing 
professional norms.” Following that discussion, it will examine the 
idea that because of the inherent link and because so many courts 
rely on the ABA standards, a violation of a constitutional right 
necessarily implies a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Finally, this Part will explore how the link between the ABA 
standards and Strickland’s “professional norms” has been applied to 
cases outside the Sixth Amendment. These cases will further enforce 
that a violation of Strickland violates the Rules sufficiently for the 
attorney to be reported to the state bar. 
A. The ABA Standards Help Define Strickland’s “Professional Norms” 
The Supreme Court has “long . . . recognized that ‘[p]revailing 
norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards 
and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable.’”132 
Thus, because they “reflect the . . . norms of the legal profession,”133 
the ABA standards “act as guides in determining the reasonableness 
of counsel’s assistance.”134 And these standards are frequently cited 
by courts in determining whether counsel’s representation was 
objectively unreasonable.135 Thus, “the use of ethical standards to 
illuminate whether a lawyer has provided ineffective assistance is not 
novel or overreaching, but well established.”136 
 
 132.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (citing Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 
U.S. 4, 7 (2009) (per curiam); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191 & n.6 (2004); Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)). 
 133.  State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Iowa 2012). 
 134.  Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 960 (1984); see also State v. Vance, 790 
N.W.2d 775, 785 (Iowa 2010) (“The Supreme Court indicates the American Bar Association 
standards and like documents reflect the prevailing norms of practice.”); Missouri v. Frye, 132 
S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (“Though the standard for counsel’s performance is not determined 
solely by reference to codified standards of professional practice, these standards can be 
important guides.”). 
 135.  See Paul V. Vapnek et al., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY Ch. 6-G (2015); Harris, 853 F. Supp. at 1254 (“These standards are 
regularly used by courts as guidelines in determining whether an attorney’s performance falls 
below reasonable professional standards.”). 
 136.  Clay, 824 N.W.2d at 502. 
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For example, courts have used the ABA standards to evaluate 
counsel’s “duty to investigate”137 and to determine whether counsel’s 
“pretrial investigation and preparation” was sufficient.138 Courts have 
used the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in determining 
ineffective assistance of counsel regarding “multiple 
representation,”139 zealous representation,140 false statements,141 and 
whether counsel was obligated to challenge the search of a vehicle.142 
Moreover, courts have often considered and invoked these 
ethical standards “recognizing that fidelity to those standards 
implicates not only the interests of the defendants, but the credibility 
of the system, its integrity, and the institutional interests in the 
rendition of just verdicts.”143 These standards and professional norms 
“illuminate” the question of whether a lawyer has provided effective 
assistance.144 And using these guidelines, standards, and rules has the 
positive effect of “draw[ing] lawyers attention to specific duties and 
tasks which are integral to effective representation.”145 
B. A Violation of Strickland Implies a Violation of the Rules 
Because so many courts have looked to the ABA’s standards to 
determine the “professional norms” relevant to ineffective assistance 
claims, when an attorney is found ineffective under Strickland, it 
necessarily implies a violation of the Model Rules. The ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, which every state has adopted in one 
form or another specifically state that “[a] lawyer shall provide 
 
 137.  Smith, 539 U.S. at 522. 
 138.  People v. Jones, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745, 761 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 139.  Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159–60 (1988). 
 140.  People v. Cropper, 152 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (Ct. App. 1979). 
 141.  In re Seelig, 850 A.2d 477, 490 (N.J. 2004) (“The Supreme Court held that a 
criminal defendant’s right to assistance of counsel does not include the right to cooperation in 
the commission of perjury in violation of the ethical standards established by states to govern 
attorney conduct.”).  
 142.  State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 786 (Iowa 2010) (“In our own analysis of 
whether counsel was ineffective, we have relied on our Code of Professional Responsibility for 
Lawyers to measure counsel’s performance.”). 
 143.  People v. DeFreitas, 630 N.Y.S.2d 755, 759 (App. Div. 1995). 
 144.  State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 502 (Iowa 2012). 
 145.  See Roberts, supra note 118, at 161 n.174 (quoting John H. Blume & Stacey D. 
Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith and 
Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance 
of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 159 (2007)). 
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competent representation to a client.”146 And “competent 
representation” requires that an attorney act with “the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation.”147 Or, in other words, competent 
representation means that an attorney will act with at least the 
minimal ability of a reasonable practitioner.148 The official comments 
further clarify that “competent handling” of a matter includes 
analysis of the factual and legal elements of an issue, sufficient 
preparation, and use of methods and procedures that meet the 
standards of other competent practitioners.149 
Based on the same language of ABA Rule 1.1, courts have 
determined in disciplinary hearings that attorneys were not 
competent for repeatedly filing and then dismissing cases when 
responses were due,150 “failing to address a potential bar to any 
patent in a patentability opinion,”151 failing to consult with a client 
and inform him of a plea agreement,152 filing frivolous claims,153 
failing to examine title or record documents,154 failing to obtain 
training to defend a capital murder case,155 failing to conduct a 
thorough investigation of the facts,156 failing to investigate alibi 
witnesses,157 failing to submit a judgment of default to the court for 
several months,158 failing to file an appropriate and sufficient post-
conviction petition,159 failing to examine the physical evidence,160 
 
 146.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. cmt. [5]. While the official comments are not authoritative, they do offer 
additional insight into the intent of the drafts of the Model Rules. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Young, 175 P.3d 371, 377 (Okla. 2007). 
 151.  In re Discipline of Peirce, 128 P.3d 443, 445 (Nev. 2006), reinstatement granted 
sub nom. In re Reinstatement of Peirce, No. 62091, 2014 WL 4804214 (Nev. Sept. 24, 2014). 
 152.  In re Disciplinary Action against Wolff, 810 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2012). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  In re Boyce, 613 S.E.2d 538, 539–40 (S.C. 2005). 
 155.  In re Hawver, 339 P.3d 573, 577 (Kan. 2014). The attorney was also incompetent 
for various other reasons, including that the attorney told the jury that they ought to execute 
the killer. See id. at 578. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Baker v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 935 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Ky. 1996). 
 159.  In re Bash, 880 N.E.2d 1182, 1183 (Ind. 2008). The court further stated that this 
was “because of his lack of understanding of fundamental requirements for obtaining post-
conviction relief. As a result, his client may have lost a potentially meritorious challenge to his 
confinement conviction.” Id. at 1184. 
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failing to interview witnesses who may have been helpful to the 
defense,161 and failing to produce evidence that would have reduced 
a sentence.162 
Just as the Professional Rules define competence in terms of 
what is “reasonable” representation, so too Strickland defines 
“competent assistance” as “reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms.”163 And “reasonableness” under Strickland 
means that an attorney cannot be ineffective unless the court finds 
that no other attorney would have made the same tactical decisions 
at trial or on appeal.164 Further, Strickland’s “prevailing professional 
norms” are guided by the Professional Rules themselves.165 Thus, 
even though the Professional Rules are “guides, and not inexorable 
commands,”166 when an attorney has acted in such a manner that no 
other attorney would act, and the court has determined that the 
attorney has fallen below the “prevailing professional norms,” he has 
necessarily failed to act with “the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”167 In other words, when an attorney has violated 
Strickland, he has also violated the Model Rules’ standard of 
competence. That being said, one scholar has noted that “ethical 
violations and ineffective assistance of counsel are not usually seen as 
one and the same.”168 But because courts have consistently used the 
ABA Guidelines and Rules of Professional Responsibility in 
establishing what in fact makes an attorney ineffective, when a court 
 
 160.  In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 96 (Ariz. 1993). The attorney also failed to interview 
witnesses, read the transcript of the grand jury proceeding that resulted in his client’s 
indictment, interview prospective witnesses disclosed in the police reports, consult with his 
client on whether the case should go to the jury on lesser included offenses, and challenge 
venire persons who stated that they would be uncomfortable sitting as a juror in a child abuse 
case. Id. 
 161.  Matter of Murray, 709 P.2d 530, 532 (Ariz. 1985). 
 162.  In re Pankowski, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007), reinstatement granted, 956 A.2d 642 
(Del. 2008). Counsel also failed to meet with the defendant before filing the motion and did 
not investigate the defendant’s medical condition. Id. 
 163.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 164.  See, e.g., Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1243 (11th Cir. 
2011) (“An attorney’s actions are sound trial strategy, and thus effective, if a reasonable 
attorney could have taken the same actions.”). 
 165.  See supra, Section IV.A. 
 166.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010) (internal citation omitted). 
 167.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1. 
 168.  Ellen Henak, When the Interests of Self, Clients, and Colleagues Collide: The Ethics of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347, 356 (2009). 
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finds an attorney so incompetent so as to violate his client’s Sixth 
Amendment rights, the court has also necessarily determined that 
the attorney has violated his duties under the Professional Rules. 
However, the relationship or link between constitutionally 
effective assistance and the Professional Rules does not necessarily go 
both ways.169 Just because an individual has violated an ethical rule 
does not necessarily mean he has violated the right to effective 
counsel. For example, in Smith v. State an attorney had been 
suspended for failing to pay his bar dues but had still represented a 
defendant, thus subjecting the attorney to professional discipline.170 
On appeal the defendant claimed that because his attorney had 
violated a Rule of Professional Conduct, he was constitutionally 
ineffective.171 But the court held that a violation of a Professional 
Rule was not a per se violation of the defendant’s right to counsel.172 
What was important was whether the “representation was sufficiently 
incompetent to violate the client’s right to effective assistance 
of counsel.”173 
Thus, it is possible to violate a professional rule without raising a 
question of ineffective assistance of counsel. But that does not 
change the fact that a violation of a client’s Sixth Amendment right 
would be a violation of the Rules. To be sure, the Supreme Court 
has also stated that “the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee 
of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal 
representation.”174 But as one scholar has stated, “[w]hile the Sixth 
Amendment may not have been designed to improve the quality of 
legal representation, neither should it serve to lessen the quality of 
that representation.”175 Thus, even though there may be some 
differences between the Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness and the 
 
 169.  See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (“[B]reach of an ethical standard 
does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance 
of counsel.”). 
 170.  Smith v. State, 243 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 725. 
 174.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“Moreover, the purpose of 
the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal 
representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The 
purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”). 
 175.  Kelly, supra note 42, at 1093. 
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Professional Rules, it would be naïve to think that the former does 
not impact the latter.176 
Certainly, there are some differences between competence as 
defined by Strickland and competence under the Professional Rules. 
For example, while a violation of the Professional Rules is a claim 
against the attorney, an ineffective assistance claim is technically 
against the State.177 Even though ineffective assistance claims may 
rise on direct appeal or in a collateral attack based on a state or 
federal statute, in both cases the parties are the government and the 
defendant—not the defendant and his prior “ineffective” counsel.178 
Thus, what a defendant is alleging when he raises an ineffective 
assistance claim is that the government unconstitutionally convicted 
him because he did not receive effective assistance of counsel as 
guaranteed by the Constitution.179 Because an ineffective assistance 
claim is not technically a claim against the defendant’s attorney, there 
are procedural differences that arise. For example, a lawyer has a 
right to participate in his own disciplinary counsel, whereas he does 
not necessarily have that right in an ineffective assistance claim.180 
Therefore, under a claim arising out of a violation of the Professional 
Rules, the attorney has the right to defend himself, whereas that is 
not necessarily the case in an ineffective assistance claim. 
But all that is required for a judge to report an attorney to a state 
bar association is knowledge that the attorney has violated a 
Professional Rule.181 Thus, even though there may be differences that 
might impact the nature of a disciplinary sanction, the differences do 
not change whether or not a judge has sufficient knowledge to 
report an attorney for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
A further difference between the Rules and a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is that in some states the standard of 
proof at a disciplinary counsel may be higher and mitigating factors 
 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Ramirez v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D.R.I. 1998), aff’d, 187 F.3d 
622 (1st Cir. 1999) (“It is the government, not the defense attorney, who suffers adverse 
consequences when a defendant’s conviction is vacated due to ‘ineffective assistance.’”). 
 178.  Utah State Bar, supra note 17; see also Henak, supra note 168, at 371 (stating that 
the “former lawyer is only a witness, and witnesses do not really ‘belong’ to any one particular 
party or side of a case”). 
 179.  Utah State Bar, supra note 17. 
 180.  In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 105 (Ariz. 1993). 
 181.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3. 
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may exist and be taken into account.182 For example, in Arizona the 
defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
constitutional defect has occurred and then the state has the burden 
of proving that the defect was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.183 But Arizona’s grounds for discipline require bar counsel to 
establish allegations by clear and convincing evidence.184 Other states 
are similar.185 But again, neither of these differences impacts whether 
or not the judge has knowledge sufficient to report an attorney. As 
Justice Martone from the Arizona Supreme Court has stated, “[T]he 
conduct which results in a denial of effective assistance of counsel 
necessarily implicates a denial of competent representation.”186 In 
other words, even though there may be mitigating factors, and even 
though the standard of proof may be different, those factors do not 
impact whether a judge has knowledge that a violation has occurred, 
only the extent of the sanction imposed.187 
In sum, because of the relationship between the Model Rules 
and Strickland, when an attorney violates his client’s Sixth 
Amendment right, he also has sufficiently violated the Professional 
Rules for a court to have the duty to report the attorney. 
 
 182.  See infra notes 183−85 
 183.  ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.8(c). 
 184.  Wolfram, 847 P.2d at 98 n.4. 
 185.  See, e.g., In re Collins, 288 P.3d 847, 854 (Kan. 2012) (“Attorney misconduct must 
be established by clear and convincing evidence.”); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Zimmerman, 
276 P.3d 1022, 1027 (Okla. 2012) (“Before discipline is imposed, misconduct must be 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.”); Fla. Bar v. Forrester, 916 So. 2d 647, 651 
(Fla. 2005) (“Given this fact, we agree with the Bar that the appropriate standard of proof is 
that which is applicable to attorney disciplinary proceedings in general, clear and convincing 
evidence.”); In re Discipline of Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1075 (Nev. 2008) (“[T]o support a 
rule violation, clear and convincing evidence must support a finding . . . .”). But see Ky. Bar 
Ass’n v. Craft, 208 S.W.3d 245, 262 (Ky. 2006) (“[T]he burden of proof shall rest upon the 
Association in a disciplinary proceeding, and the facts must be proven by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”) (citation omitted); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 48 A.3d 1231, 
1236 (Pa. 2012) (“In attorney disciplinary proceedings, the [Office of Disciplinary Counsel] 
bears the burden of establishing attorney misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 186.  Wolfram, 847 P.2d at 106. 
 187.  For example, see UTAH COURTS. Judicial Council Rules Judicial Administration 
Rule 14-607, https://www.utcourts.gov/ resources/ rules/ ucja/ view.html? rule= ch14/ 06%20 
 Standards %20 for%20 Lawyer %20 Sanctions/ USB14-607.html, which states that “[a]fter 
misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be considered 
and weighed in deciding what sanction to impose.” But again, those mitigating factors are 
considered after the court has determined that a violation has occurred. 
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C. Ineffective Assistance and Asylum 
Moreover, this type of connection between a constitutional right 
violation as a result of counsel’s ineffectiveness and the Professional 
Rules has already been applied in other similar cases. Take, for 
example, the case of asylum. Granted, it is important to note at the 
outset of this discussion that an ineffective assistance claim for 
asylum arises not out of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but 
out of the “due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.”188 But 
the requirements to establish ineffective assistance under the Fifth 
Amendment are remarkably similar to those of the Sixth 
Amendment.189 Thus it is very instructive of how Sixth Amendment 
violations should be applied. 
Similar to a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim, where 
the defendant is claiming that his attorney was so terrible that he 
deprived his client of a fair trial,190 when an alien files an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim under the Fifth Amendment, he is 
claiming that “the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the 
alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.”191 And 
similar to a Strickland claim, the petitioner must show (1) “that 
counsel failed to perform with sufficient competence,” and (2) “that 
she was prejudiced by counsel’s performance.”192 But unlike a 
Strickland claim, before an alien is allowed to file an ineffective 
assistance claim, he or she is expected to comply with several 
procedural guidelines. 
 
 188.  Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
“[a]lthough there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a deportation proceeding, the 
due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment ‘still must be afforded to an alien petitioner.’” 
(quoting Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2004))). 
 189.  Compare Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that to 
establish ineffective assistance under the Fifth Amendment petitioners must (1) “demonstrate 
that counsel [failed to] perform with sufficient competence” and (2) “show that they were 
prejudiced by their counsel’s performance”) (internal citation omitted), with Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The prejudice prong of the Fifth Amendment right is 
slightly different than Strickland’s in that under the Fifth Amendment all that has been 
required is that the “performance of counsel was so inadequate that it may have affected the 
outcome of the proceedings.” Ortiz v. I.N.S., 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 190.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 385 (2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 686). 
 191.  Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 793 (citation omitted). 
 192.  Id. 
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First, the alien must submit an affidavit that includes and explains 
“the agreement that was entered into with former counsel.”193 
Second, “former counsel must be informed of the allegations and 
allowed the opportunity to respond.”194 And finally, “the motion 
should reflect whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate 
disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, and if not, 
why not.”195 If an individual fails these procedural requirements, the 
proceedings may be dismissed.196 
In sum, the implication of these requirements is that there 
cannot be ineffective assistance in the constitutional sense unless 
there is also incompetence in the ABA sense. Thus, by adopting197 
and approving198 the requirement to file a complaint with the 
appropriate disciplinary authorities every time a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is raised, both courts and administrative 
agencies are recognizing the important and inherent link between 
the ABA standards and constitutionally effective assistance. 
What is interesting about these requirements is not just that the 
requirements exist, but also their reasoning. Citing Lozada, the Sixth 
Circuit stated: 
The requirement that disciplinary authorities be notified of 
breaches of professional conduct not only serves to deter meritless 
claims of ineffective representation but also highlights the standards 
which should be expected of attorneys who represent persons in 
 
 193.  Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988), overruled by Compean, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. 1, 1 (B.I.A. 2009); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (2015); Debeatham v. Holder, 602 F.3d 
481, 484 (2d Cir. 2010). It is important to note that not all circuits have required exact 
compliance with these rules. See Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“[F]ailure to comply with Lozada requirements is not necessarily fatal to a motion to 
reopen.”); Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim may “go forward when there is substantial compliance 
with Lozada such that the purpose of Lozada is ‘fully served by other means.’”) (citation 
omitted). But see Henton v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 520 F. App’x 801, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (“We 
have held that all three of Lozada’s procedural requirements must be satisfied.”). 
 194.  Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  See Henton, 520 F. App’x at 804; Pepaj v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 725, 727 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“An alien who fails to comply with Lozada’s requirements forfeits her ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim.”). 
 197.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(iii). 
 198.  Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 2 (stating that courts have “acknowledged that the 
Lozada framework had largely stood the test of time, having been expressly reaffirmed by the 
Board 15 years after its initial adoption”) (internal citation omitted). 
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immigration proceedings, the outcome of which may, and often 
does, have enormous significance for the person.199 
And if there is “enormous significance” for asylum, which 
demands a duty to report the attorney, is there not also “enormous 
significance” in a capital case? Or when an individual faces life in 
prison? When an individual’s freedom is at stake, as is the case in a 
criminal prosecution, surely that creates the possibility of 
consequences that are enormously significant to the defendant. In 
addition, if the purpose of the Lozada requirements are to “deter 
meritless claims,” how much more important would a similar 
requirement be in criminal cases. Ineffective assistance is the most 
raised claim,200 yet only a fraction of those claims are deemed 
meritorious by the courts.201 That would indicate many, many 
meritless claims. 
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND 
THE MODEL RULES CREATES THE SOLUTION—
MANDATORY REPORTING 
This recognized link between the Professional Rules and 
constitutionally ineffective assistance creates the needed remedy—
make it mandatory for judges to report an attorney to the bar when 
a counsel has been found ineffective. This would correct the many 
problems created by the current lack of any remedy against the 
ineffective counsel.202 
Because of the self-regulating nature of the legal profession, the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct already require an attorney to 
report another attorney for a violation of those Rules.203 And judges 
have a similar duty to report violations. Specifically, when a judge has 
knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, the judge is required to report that 
attorney.204 Even if a judge receives information that indicates a 
substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the 
 
 199.  Pepaj, 509 F.3d at 727 (quoting Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639–40).  
 200.  Supra notes 75–79. 
 201.  Supra notes 75–79. 
 202.  Supra Part II. 
 203.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3. 
 204.  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15. 
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Rules, he is required to take “appropriate action” against that 
attorney.205 
Yet no one seems to be taking upon himself or herself to report 
attorneys who have violated a client’s constitutional Rights. As one 
scholar noted, “It seems that trial judges and opposing counsel may 
be ignoring the fact that incompetence is unethical and judge and 
lawyer alike are equally culpable for not taking steps to report the 
particular practitioner.”206 Thus, the solution is simply to require 
judges and attorneys to report the deficient attorney after he is found 
ineffective. To be sure, the Rules state that the reporting 
requirement is only applied when an attorney has committed a 
violation that raises a “substantial question as to that lawyer’s . . . 
fitness as a lawyer.”207 But the official comments clarify that the term 
“substantial” refers to “the seriousness of the possible offense.”208 
And the more serious the offense, the more reason to report 
the violation.209 
Now, when an attorney violates a client’s Sixth Amendment right 
under Strickland, it is because the court has determined that he has 
fallen far below any objective level of reasonableness.210 In fact, in 
order for there to be ineffective assistance, the attorney must have 
“made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”211 It 
follows logically that if counsel has been so deficient to not be 
functioning as counsel, of course a substantial question arises as to 
the lawyer’s fitness. 
I am not suggesting a scheme similar to asylum,212 where once a 
claim of ineffective assistance is raised the petitioner is required to 
 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Kelly, supra note 42, at 1094–95 (“Under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the judge and the lawyer have a duty to inform 
the appropriate professional disciplinary authority when either knows that a practitioner is not 
fit to practice. All of us must be cognizant of our professional duty to assist in and improve the 
legal system.”) (footnote omitted). 
 207.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r 8.3. 
 208.  Id. cmt. 3. 
 209.  Gerard E. Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 539 (1986) (“The 
more serious the violation, the more likely it is that people will universally agree that there is a 
moral duty to report it.”). 
 210.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
 211.  State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 785 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687). 
 212.  Supra Section III.C. 
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report the deficient attorney to the bar, but I am suggesting that 
after the attorney is actually found ineffective, he should be reported. 
This could be accomplished by simply requiring the court to instruct 
the clerk to send a copy of the order to the state bar every time the 
judge finds an attorney ineffective. Because of the relatively low 
number of ineffective assistance claims that actually win, this would 
not be a huge burden on any state bar association. But it would 
show to both the bar as well as to those claiming ineffective 
assistance the seriousness of their claim—that the attorney was so 
incompetent that he was not functioning as counsel. 
And if attorneys and judges really understood the seriousness of 
the claim that they were raising as well as the possible negative 
consequences against the alleged ineffective attorney, that in turn 
would have many positive impacts on the judicial system. It would 
reduce frivolous claims. It would deter attorneys from “falling on 
their sword.” And it would deter ineffective attorneys from 
continuing to give terrible assistance.213 In sum, reporting ineffective 
attorneys would increase society’s faith in the judicial system. 
VI. CONCLUSION—RAISING THE BAR 
It has been stated that “[a]ttorney competence directly affects 
the fairness of our criminal proceedings.”214 But a system that fails to 
impose any real repercussions on the attorney who is so ineffective 
that he is no longer acting as counsel permits society to lose faith in 
the judicial system itself. However, because of the inherent link 
between competence, as defined by the ABA Rules, and Strickland, 
simply requiring judges to report constitutionally ineffective 
attorneys after finding them ineffective presents a workable remedy. 
 
 213.  See People v. Henderson, 776 N.W.2d 906, 907 (Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J., 
concurring) (“Further, referral to the AGC in these cases avoids encouraging attorneys to use 
this Court to correct for their own ineffective representation at the Court of Appeals.”). 
 214.  In re Hawver, 339 P.3d 573, 591 (Kan. 2014). 
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Doing so will provide an immediate, positive impact on the 
system. Ineffective attorneys would either improve or be removed, 
defendants would be more likely to receive a fair trial, and the 
general level of skill and competence of practicing attorneys would 
increase. As a result, the low Strickland bar may very well rise. 
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